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Kant, Kierkegaard, James and Evans have four different accounts of belief which
are never compared or carefully analyzed (i.e., an occurrent notion, a strong
volitional notion wherein every belief is volitionally acquired, a behavioral notion
and Price's dispositional notion). Until we are clear on what belief is it is difficult
to know how it relates to action.

The Concept of God: An Exploration of Contemporary Difficulties with the
Attributes of God, by Ronald H. Nash. Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing
House, 1983. Pp. 127.
Reviewed by CLEMENT DORE, Vanderbilt University.
Professor Nash's book is, on the whole, a clearly written, helpful introduction
to contemporary discussions of the nature of God. It will be of particular value
for those who are not well acquainted with recent literature on the subject; but
it will also be of use to those "analytic" religionists who have paid scant attention
to process theology: Nash discusses the differences between process theologians
and contemporary Thomists at length.
I have some reservations about the book, three of the most substantive of
which I will now mention.
Nash appears to be presenting us on p. 17 with an actualist account of possible
worlds, on which any individual in another possible world is identical with an
individual in the actual world (though, of course, different in some respects).
But surely, e.g., dragons exist in some possible worlds; and it looks as if it is
in principle impossible adequately to specify individuals in the actual world who
are identical with them. If the actualist chooses to claim that every individual
in the actual world is a possible dragon, then the reply is that it is possible for
there to be a larger number of dragons than there are individuals in the actual
world. And similar considerations apply to the actualist claim that it is, e.g.,
actual reptiles (actual flame throwers, etc.) which might have been dragons.
A more fund~mental problem is that actualism renders modal arguments for
God's existence question-begging. If every individual which exists in a possible
world is identical with an actual individual, then claiming that God exists in a
possible world (or, borrowing from Plantinga, that there is a possible world in
which maximality is exemplified) is eo ipso claiming that God exists in the actual
world. So the possibility premiss, which is indispensable in all modal arguments
for God's existence, would be, in those contexts, as good a candidate for being
question-begging as any skeptic might desire, in the absence of a more extensive
defense of it than modal arguers generally provide.
It is, of course, true that, in order to establish that God exists in all his
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supremacy in the actual world, the modal arguer requires the further premiss
that it is a necessary truth that if God exists, then he is maximally perfect in
every world in which he exists. But that does not block the charge of question-begging against the actualist who claims that, since God exists in a possible world,
he exists, in some fashion or other, in the actual world.
On pp. 65-66, Nash cites favorably Aquinas' approach to the problem of how
human beings can do other than they do, even though God, in his omniscience,
has known from all eternity what they would do. What Aquinas says in effect
about this problem is that though the sentence, "If God knows that S will do A,
then S will ,do A", expresses a necessary truth, it does not follow that the
sentence, "If God knows that S will do A, then S will necessarily do A", also
expresses a necessary truth or, indeed, that it expresses a truth of any kind.
Nash appears to think that people who are worried about the problem of God's
foreknowledge and human freedom are simply misplacing a modal operator.
("Necessarly, if God knows that p, then p", which expresses a necessary truth,
does not entail "If God knows that p, then necessarily p.") But in fact the problem
is not so easily solved. For it can be formulated without the commission of any
such fallacy. Suppose that God knew in 1930 that "Dore will write a review of
Nash's book in May of 1984" expressed a true proposition. And suppose that it
is now May of 1984 and I have it in my power to refrain from writing such a
review. But now if I refrain, then not only did "Dore will write the review in
May of 1984" express a truth in 1930 but "Dore will not write the review in
May of 1984" did so as well. Hence, given God's foreknowledge, my having
it in my power not to write the review is eo ipso my having it in my power to
bring it about that two contradictory propositions are both true. (And, of course,
we can generalize: For any action about which God knew that a person would
do it, the latter has it in his power to refrain from doing it only if he has it in
his power to make two contradictory propositions true.)
An alternative conclusion is that, even though it was true in 1930 that God
knew then that I would not refrain from writing this review, I now have it in
my power to bring it about that God did not know that in 1930. But this conclusion
is surely as unpalatable as the former one.
I should point out here that I am not endorsing the envisaged argument for
predestination, but rather maintaining that the problem of divine (and, indeed,
human) foreknowledge and human freedom is more intractable than Nash appears
to realize.
There are two further criticisms of Nash's approach to God's foreknowledge:
(1) Nash says on p. 66 that "given that God is essentially omniscient", the
sentence, "Whatever God knows is true", expresses a necessary truth. But God's
being essentially omniscient is not a necessary condition of the envisaged sentence
expressing a necessary truth. I am not essentially omniscient, but, in view of
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the meaning of "knows", "Whatever Dore knows is true" also expresses a necessary truth. (2) Nash nowhere indicates that theological fatalism is not the only
kind of fatalism. Suppose that no one knew in 1930 that "Dore will write a
review of Nash's book in May of 1984" expressed a truth. Still, the proposition
which it expresses was in fact true. And this provides the non-theological fatalist
with as firm a foundation as the theological fatalist can lay claim to. My having
it in my power to refrain from performing the envisaged action looks like my
having it in my power either to make two contradictory propositions true or to
render what was true in 1930 no longer true in 1930.
Finally, I do not think that Nash always succeeds in making clear just why
there is a particular problem about God's nature. For example, we find on p.
104 that "While human beings normally come to have knowledge about other
persons in a passive way (by being acted upon causally), this avenue of knowledge
is clearly out of the question (for Thomists)." And Nash subsequently accepts
the Thomistic claim that God is absolutely causally independent of other beings.
But, we are left in the dark as to why God would be less than a maximally
perfect being if my writing this review now caused God to know (from all
eternity) that I am doing so. It is far from clear that every kind of causal
dependency is perfection-diminishing.
Also, we are introduced to the problem of God's immutability (on p. 99) by
the following argument, "ooa perfect being must be incapable of change. After
all, change must be for the better or the worse." Nash in effect abandons this
latter claim later in the chapter; but I submit that it is highly implausible on it's
face and, hence, not a genuine problem raiser.

Religion: If there is no God. On God, the Devil, Sin and other Worries of the
so-called Philosophy of Religion, by Leszek Kolakowski. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982. $19.95.
00

Reviewed by FREDERICK FERRE, University of Georgia.
This book also exists in a paperback edition available in Great Britain through
Fontana Paperbacks, presumably for much less than the outrageous cost of the
hardbound edition. Even at half--or one fourth--of the price, however, these
contents are not worth recommending for purchase. I am surprised that Oxford
University Press published the book at all.
I am particularly surprised that such a distinguished Press allowed the book's
text to be continually interrupted-sometimes in mid-sentence-with inserts of
quotations, printed in bold-face type, that mar the appearance ofthe page (making
each chapter look like an article in some Sunday Supplement magazine) and ruin

